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Abstract
At arbitrary prices of commodities and assets, ﬁx-price equilibria exist under weak assumptions:
endowmentsneednotsatisfyaninterioritycondition,utilityfunctionsneedonlysatisfyaveryweak
monotonicity requirement, and the asset return matrix allows for redundant assets. Prices of assets
may permit arbitrage. At equilibrium, though restricted through endogenously determined trading
constraints, arbitrage possibilities may persist; in an example, an individual holds an arbitrage
portfolio. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Trade occurs at prices different from competitive equilibrium prices; this is the case in
active,competitivemarkets,assetmarketsinparticular,wherepricesadjustwhilepurchases
and sales are carried out.
The study of markets and the allocations that they generate requires a consistent descrip-
tion of the exchanges that occur at arbitrary prices of commodities and assets. In the market
microstructureliterature,marketmakersabsorbdiscrepanciesbetweensupplyanddemand.
Here, endogenous bounds on purchases or sales yield market clearing.
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The problem that arises is to take the consequences of excess supply and excess demand
into account in a way that is consistent both with individual optimization and with the
transparency of markets. The deﬁnition of a ﬁx-price equilibrium introduced by Bénassy
(1975) and Drèze (1975) under certainty extends to economies with uncertainty and an
incomplete asset market.
Equilibria exist under extremely weak assumptions. Any assumption on the interiority
of individual endowments or on positive aggregate endowments is absent. That minimum
wealth is not crucial in models with price rigidities and rationing was observed in Herings
(1996);thereendogenouslyemergingconstraintsmightgiverisetominimumwealthpoints.
Here, the endowments of individuals may lie on the boundaries of their consumption sets,
and the asset market is incomplete; this generality is important in settings with time and
uncertainty.
The payoffs of assets are not restricted. With the prices of commodities ﬁxed, assets may
be nominal, numeraire or real. More importantly, the asset return matrix need not have full
column rank. Redundant assets are allowed, which gives rise to difﬁculties in the argument
for existence, as it is now not trivial to compactify budget sets. To restrict attention to a
subset of independent assets is not appropriate: in the presence of trading constraints, an
individual may wish to trade in several collinear assets.
The prices of assets may allow for arbitrage. The logical consequence of arbitrage op-
portunities is that all individuals want to exploit them, and therefore all individuals tend to
be on the same side of asset markets that are used to construct an arbitrage portfolio. An
individual performing arbitrage will therefore have difﬁculties in ﬁnding trading partners
on the other side of the markets. This generates endogenous trading constraints that limit
arbitrage opportunities. An important question is whether indeed arbitrage possibilities are
completely eliminated by the endogenous trading constraints. Surprisingly, this turns out
not to be the case. In an example, an individual holds an arbitrage portfolio at equilibrium,
that is supplied, collectively, by the others.
The existence of competitive equilibria was proved by Arrow and Debreu (1954) and
McKenzie(1954)ingreatgenerality.Crucialtotheresult,however,wastheeffectiveabsence
ofuncertainty.Withuncertaintyandanincompleteassetmarket,theexistenceofcompetitive
equilibria poses important problems.
Forthesimplestcase,withnominalassets,denominatedinunitsofaccount,ornumeraire
assets, equilibrium existence results are given in Werner (1985) and Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1986). But even in this case, strong convexity and monotonicity assump-
tions on preferences are not sufﬁcient for the existence of an equilibrium when individual
endowments of some commodities are allowed to be zero in some states. Counterexamples
to existence were given in Gottardi and Hens (1996). They also provided sufﬁcient condi-
tions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the case of numeraire assets, which
include strict monotonicity and strict quasi-concavity of the utility function and a strictly
positive aggregate endowment as well as a resource relatedness assumption on individual
endowments, which strengthens the assumption in McKenzie (1959, 1961). In models with
time and uncertainty, even such conditions appear strong, as it is quite likely that in some
states of the world certain commodities are not available.
For the case of real assets, a counterexample to existence was given in Hart (1975).A
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a generic existence result. However, strong differentiability and monotonicity assumptions
on utility functions were employed. More importantly, genericity in the payoffs of assets
is particularly disturbing; also, for assets whose payoffs are not linear in the prices of
commodities, such as options, though Krasa and Werner (1991) obtained generic existence,
it is also possible to obtain robust counterexamples to existence, as in Polemarchakis and
Ku (1990).
Onecanarguethat,whenacompetitiveequilibriumdoesnotexist,pricesofcommodities
and assets do emerge against which trade takes place. The determination of such prices
would require the speciﬁcation of a complicated dynamic process. The failure in explaining
why prices are rigid and why quantities adjust faster than prices can be considered as a
general drawback of the ﬁx-price approach. At least three approaches to explain the rigidity
ofpricesaretakenintheﬁx-priceliterature.Therearemodelswithendogenouspricesetting
of agents with market power, see for instance Bénassy (1988) or Bonanno (1990). Drèze
and Gollier (1993) and Drèze (2001) argue that price rigidities are a response to market
incompleteness. This argument is particularly valid for the two forms of underemployment
ofresourcesmostfrequentlyencountered,unemployedlaborandexcesscapacities,twoclear
examples of commodities for which future markets are hardly developed. Finally, Herings
(1997) and Tuinstra (2000) show that political interference in the market mechanism can
be rational from a partisan point of view and might be responsible for sustained deviations
from prices that clear the markets. Here, we consider the more modest hypothesis that the
prices at which trade takes place are given.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, the assumptions,
and the equilibrium concept. The possible redundancy of the asset return matrix calls for a
closeranalysisofthesetoffeasibleallocationsofassets.InSection3,theso-calledminimal
effective feasible allocations of assets are considered, and they are shown to be bounded.
Section4givesaproofoftheexistenceofequilibrium,andSection5illustratestheconcepts
by analyzing the counterexample to existence of a competitive equilibrium that is given in
Hart (1975). Sections 6 and 7 consider the arbitrage opportunities that may be present
at equilibrium. Section 6 gives some positive results on the impossibility of performing
arbitrage. Section 7 shows the limitations of those results, by means of the example that has
been alluded to before.
2. The economy
The economy is the standard two-period general equilibrium model with incomplete
asset markets and numeraire assets. Transactions occur in assets before and in commodities
after the state of nature is known. An economy E = ((Xi,u i,ei)i∈I,R(p,q))consists of
consumption sets Xi, utility functions ui and endowments ei for all individuals i ∈ I, and
an asset return matrix R(p,q) that speciﬁes the payoffs of assets in each state of nature in
units of account at prices of commodities p and prices of assets q.
Statesoftheworldares ∈ S ={ 1,...,S}andcommoditiesarel ∈ L ={ 1,...,L+1}.
At state s, commodity (L + 1,s)is assumed to be a numeraire commodity, so its price is
pL+1,s = 1. The domain of prices of commodities is P ={ p ∈ R(L+1)S : pL+1,s = 1,
s ∈ S}. Assets are a ∈ A ={ 1,...,A+ 1}. Asset A + 1 is assumed to be a numeraire136 P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155
asset, its price is qA+1 = 1. The domain of prices of assets is Q ={ q ∈ RA+1 : qA+1 = 1}.
Commodities other than the numeraire are ˇ L ={ 1,...,L}, and assets other than the
numeraire are ˇ A ={ 1,...,A}.
Thenumeraireassetplaystheroleofthemediumofexchangebeforethestateofnatureis
known. After the state of nature has been realized, say the state of nature is s, the numeraire
commodity(L+1,s)performsthisrole.FollowingGeanakoplosandPolemarchakis(1986),
it can be shown that a model with ﬁrst period consumption is a special case of our model.
A utility function ui is weakly monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in
everystateoftheworldif,forallxi ∈ Xi,fors ∈ S,fork ≥ 0,ui(xi +k1(L+1)s) ≥ ui(xi),
where 1j denotes the j-th unit vector of appropriate dimension. Weak monotonicity in the
numerairecommoditymeansthatanindividualthatisgivenmoreofthenumerairecommod-
ity is not worse off. In particular, it does not exclude noxious non-numeraire commodities
or a numeraire commodity that does not enter in the utility function of the individual.
The economy satisﬁes the following assumptions.
A1. For every individual i, the consumption set is Xi = R
(L+1)S
+ .
A2. For every individual i, the utility function is continuous, quasi-concave and weakly
monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in every state of the world.
A3. For every individual i, the endowment is an element of the consumption set,ei ∈ Xi.
The endowments are an arbitrary element of the consumption set. No strict positivity
assumptions are made. The realistic case that individuals do not possess many commodities
or even that some commodities are totally unavailable in certain states of the world is not
excluded. This makes it for instance possible to model uncertain outcomes of research and
development.
No restrictions are made on the payoffs of assets. Assets may be nominal, numeraire
or real. The payoffs of assets may be non-linear in commodity prices, as is the case with
options. The asset return matrix need not have full column rank. Redundant assets are
allowed for.
UnderAssumptionsA1–A3,acompetitiveequilibriummaynotexist,asfollowsfromthe
counterexamples to existence of Hart (1975), Polemarchakis and Ku (1990), and Gottardi
and Hens (1996). We take the point of view that even when a competitive equilibrium does
not exist, some prices of commodities and assets will emerge against which trade takes
place. The explanation of the prices at which trade will eventually take place would require
thespeciﬁcationofacomplicateddynamicprocess,whichisbeyondthescopeofthepresent
paper. We start out from the more modest hypothesis that the prices at which trade will take
place are given. The challenge is to take into account in a consistent way the consequences
of excess supply and excess demand.
We analyse the allocation that results given any terms of trade, that is at any given prices
of commodities ¯ p ∈ P and any given prices of assets ¯ q ∈ Q. No assumptions are made on
¯ p and ¯ q, except that they belong to P and Q. In particular, no non-negativity assumptions
are imposed on prices of commodities. Since no monotonicity requirements are imposed
on non-numeraire commodities, such non-negativity assumptions would not make sense.P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155 137
In certain cases, it might make sense to restrict attention to prices of assets ¯ q that exclude
arbitrage opportunities. Since our analysis is valid for all prices in Q, such an assumption
is not made. The asset return matrix at prices ( ¯ p, ¯ q)is ¯ R = R( ¯ p, ¯ q).
At arbitrary terms of trade, a competitive equilibrium is typically ruled out. In general,
excesssupplyandexcessdemandoccurs.Thespeciﬁcationofanallocationthatisconsistent




possible, rationing is assumed to be uniform across individuals.1 In case of excess supply
in a market, all suppliers will therefore have equal, but limited, opportunities to supply.
The limited supply opportunities have spillovers to other markets, which may introduce
rationing constraints in markets that cleared before. Rationing in the supply (demand) of
commodities other than the numeraire is z
¯
∈− RLs
+ (¯ z ∈ RLs
+). Rationing in the supply
(demand) of assets other than the numeraire is y
¯
∈− RA
+ (¯ y ∈ RA
+).









, ¯ y) = (xi,yi) ∈ Xi × RA+1 :
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    
¯ qyi ≤ 0,
¯ ps(xi
s − ei









l,s ≤¯ zl,s,( l , s ) ∈ ˇ L×S
The optimization problem of the individual is to choose a utility maximizing consumption






At a given rationing scheme, an individual is effectively rationed in his supply (demand)
for a commodity or an asset if he could increase his utility when the rationing scheme
in the supply (demand) of that commodity or asset is removed. There is effective supply
(demand) rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset if at least one individual is
effectively rationed in his supply (demand) for this commodity or asset. Prices ( ¯ p, ¯ q)admit
a competitive equilibrium if all markets clear without effective rationing. This makes the
concept of competitive equilibrium a special case of the notion here.2
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i=1 yi∗ = 0,





l,s, then for all i ∈ Ixi∗
l,s −ei
l,s < ¯ z∗
l,s, while
if for some i xi ∗
l,s − ei 
l,s =¯ z∗






1 All our results remain true for more general (non-manipulable) rationing schemes.
2 When prices are competitive, there might be ﬁx-price equilibrium allocations different from the competitive
equilibrium allocation.138 P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155




a, then for all i ∈ Iyi∗
a < ¯ y∗
a, while if for some
i  yi ∗
a =¯ y∗






3 and 4, together with the convexity of the consumption sets and the quasi-concavity of the
utilityfunctionsofindividuals,implythatthereisnoeffectiverationing,simultaneously,on
bothsidesofamarket.Thisexpressesthatwedonotdepartfromthescenariooffrictionless
markets that characterizes competitive equilibria with incomplete markets. Markets are
transparent in the sense that it is not possible to ﬁnd a buyer and a seller in a single market
thatcouldbeneﬁtfrommutualexchangeagainstthenumeraire.Thedeﬁnitionofequilibrium
isaspecialcaseofthedeﬁnitiongiveninDrèze(1975)toanalyzetheconsequencesofprice
rigidities on the allocation of resources in a complete markets setting.
3. Minimal effective feasible allocations of assets
The standard approach to show the existence of an equilibrium is to compactify con-
sumption sets, show upper hemi-continuity of the demand correspondence δi, i ∈ I, and
apply Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem to a suitably constructed correspondence. This ap-
proach fails in our set-up as a compactiﬁed consumption set does not generate bounds on
assets portfolios that individuals may be willing to hold. This is due to the absence of an
assumption that requires that assets are not collinear.
In the standard incomplete markets model, the presence of collinearity poses no prob-
lems. One restricts attention to an independent subset of assets whose span equals the span
of the asset return matrix. Such an approach fails in our set-up because endogenous ra-
tioning constraints are present. Individuals have good reasons to trade in several collinear
assets if this mitigates the restrictions imposed by rationing. There is no way to select an
independent subset of assets a priori, without possibly limiting the trading opportunities of
the individuals.
In this section, we show that it is still possible to compactify the set of asset portfolios,
without reducing the trading opportunities of individuals. Our aim is basically to consider
only asset portfolios that are minimally effective, i.e. achieve a certain distribution of rev-
enuesoverfuturestateswithminimaltradeintheassetmarket.Afurthercomplicationisthat
one should not consider minimal effective portfolios of assets, but minimal effective fea-





the asset portfolios yi∗, i ∈ I, are replaced by minimal effective asset portfolios, it is not
necessarily the case that the asset markets still clear. Minimal effective feasible allocations
of assets is what is called for.
The effective consumption set of individual i is





l,s,(l,s)∈ L × S}.
If (x1,...,xI) is a feasible allocation of commodities, then xi ∈ ¯ Xi for every indi-









s). The set of effective
revenue plans of individual i is
¯ Wi ={ wi ∈ RS : thereisxi ∈ ¯ Xi suchthatwi = wi(xi)}.
The set of effective portfolios of assets of individual i is
¯ Yi ={ yi ∈ RA+1 : ¯ qyi = 0, thereiswi ∈ ¯ Wi suchthatwi = ¯ Ryi}.
Thesets ¯ Xi and ¯ Wi areobviouslycompact.Thisisnotnecessarilysoforthesetofeffective
portfolios of assets of an individual, since the matrix of payoffs of assets need not have full
column rank.












Equivalently, y ∈ ¯ Y if there is wi ∈ ¯ Wi, i ∈ I, such that













































and IA+1 denotes the unit matrix of dimension A + 1. The matrix M is of dimension
(IS + I + A + 1) × I(A+ 1).
The set of minimal effective feasible allocations of assets is
ˆ Y ={¯ y ∈ ¯ Y :  ∃y ∈ ¯ Y with ¯ Ryi = ¯ R¯ yi,i∈ I,sign(y) ∈ sign(¯ y),|y| < |¯ y|},
where sign(x) denotes the sign vector of x, Sign(x) a set of sign vectors related to x as
speciﬁedbelow,and|x|theabsolutevaluevectorassociatedwiththevectorx.Acomponent
of sign(x) is 1,0o r−1 if the corresponding component of x is > 0,0o r< 0, respectively.
The set Sign(x) consists of those sign vectors v for which a component of v i s1o r0i f
the corresponding component of sign(x) is 1, a component of v is 0 if the corresponding
componentofsign(x)is0,andacomponentofv is−1or0 ifthecorrespondingcomponent
of sign(x)is −1. A component of |x| is the absolute value of the corresponding compo-
nent of x. The set ˆ Y contains the effective feasible allocations of assets that are minimal.140 P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155
There is no effective feasible allocation of assets such that at least one individual could
attain the same revenue plan with less trade, in absolute value, in at least one of the assets.
In the analysis of the set of equilibria of an economy, there is no loss of generality to





∗, ¯ y∗)) is an equilibrium for E at prices ( ¯ p, ¯ q), then there is ˆ y ∈ ˆ Y




∗, ¯ y∗)) is an equilibrium for E at prices ( ¯ p, ¯ q). Our aim is to
show that ˆ Y is bounded.
Since M need not have full column rank, the left-inverse of M may not exist. By the
singular value decomposition, there exist orthogonal matrices U, of dimension (I(S+1)+
A + 1) × (I(S + 1) + A + 1), and V, of dimension I(A+ 1) × I(A+ 1), such that
U MV =  , where   is a matrix of dimension (I(S + 1) + A + 1) × I(A+ 1) with
non-negative elements (σ1,...,σ I(A+1)) on the diagonal and zero off-diagonal elements.3
Moreover, there is r such that the ﬁrst r elements of (σ1,...,σ I(A+1)) are positive and
the others are zero. The Moore–Penrose inverse of M is deﬁned by M+ = V +U , where
 + is a matrix of dimension I(A+ 1) × (I(S + 1) + A + 1) with non-negative elements
(1/σ1,...,1/σr,0,...,0) on the diagonal and zero off-diagonal elements.
An important property of the Moore–Penrose inverse is the following. Consider some
z ∈ RI(S+1)+A+1.I fyR = M+z, then yR is an element in the row space of M such that
z = MyR, and yR is the unique element of the row space of M with this property.
Lemma 3.1. The set ˆ Y is bounded.
Proof. If ˆ Y is not bounded, then there exists a sequence (yn ∈ ˆ Y : n = 1,...)such that
||yn||∞ ≥ n. We deﬁne wn = (( ¯ Ry1
n) ,...,(¯ RyI
n) ) . Since ¯ Wi is compact, there is no
loss of generality in assuming that the sequence (wn ∈ RIS : n = 1,...)is convergent.
Moreover, without loss of generality, sign(yn) is independent of n.
yR,n = M+(w 
n,0,0)  andyN,n = yn − yR,n, forn = 1,...
The sequence (yR,n : n = 1,...)is convergent, and therefore bounded. Since (yn ∈ ˆ Y :




yN,n : n = 1,...
 
is well-deﬁned and convergent, with limit ¯ yN. Evidently, M ¯ yN = 0, and there is i  such
that ¯ yi 
N  = 0.
Moreover, ¯ yi
N,a  = 0 implies limn→∞|yi
n,a|=∞ , sign(yi
n,a)>0 implies ¯ yi
N,a ≥ 0,
sign(yi
n,a) = 0 implies ¯ yi
N,a = 0, and sign(yi
n,a)<0 implies ¯ yi
N,a ≤ 0.
So, there exists n  such that for n ≥ n , sign(yn −¯ yN) = sign(yn).




is a  such that |yi 
n,a  −¯ yi 
N,a | < |yi 
n,a |.
Hence, for n ≥ n , yn / ∈ ˆ Y, a contradiction. 
3 An orthogonal matrix is a matrix with orthonormal columns, so both U U and V  V are identity matrices.P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155 141
Even when arbitrage possibilities are present, it is possible to restrict attention to a
bounded set of asset allocations. Since ˆ Y is bounded, there exists ˆ α>0 such that ||y||∞ <
ˆ α for all y ∈ ˆ Y.
4. The existence of equilibria
To show the existence of equilibrium, it is essential that budget constraints hold with
equality. Since the utility functions of individuals are weakly monotonically increasing
in the numeraire commodity, there is no loss of generality in assuming that all second
period budget constraints hold with equality. For the ﬁrst period budget constraint, ei-
ther one imposes this condition directly on the budget set, or one makes the following
assumption.
A4. The numeraire asset satisﬁes ¯ R·A+1 ≥ 0.
Since the utility functions of individuals are weakly monotonically increasing in all
numeraire commodities, ¯ R·A+1 ≥ 0 implies that the numeraire asset is weakly desirable,
so without loss of generality the budget constraint of the individual in the market for assets
is satisﬁed with equality.
It can be veriﬁed that if ﬁrst period consumption is present, assumption A4 is automati-
cally satisﬁed if the model with ﬁrst period consumption is rewritten into the one without
ﬁrst period consumption.








, ¯ y) of individual i is




, ¯ y)that satisfy the budget constraint in every state
with equality: ¯ qyi = 0 and ¯ ps(xi
s −ei
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, ¯ y), since the util-
ity function is weakly monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in every









, ¯ y), since the utility function is not necessarily strictly monotonically
increasing.
Lemma 4.1. If E satisﬁes A1–A3, then the correspondence ˜ δi is non-empty, compact and
convex valued, and upper hemi-continuous.








, ¯ y),s o ˜ βi(z
¯
, ¯ z, y
¯
, ¯ y) is
non-empty.




, ¯ y)is closed and convex.
The set of non-numeraire commodities ˇ L×S is partitioned into the subsets of commodi-
ties with positive prices, K+, negative prices, K−, and free commodities, K0. The set of
non-numeraire assets ˇ A is partitioned into the subsets of assets with positive prices, A+,




, ¯ y), −y
¯
a ≤ yi
a ≤¯ ya,142 P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155





























and, thus, the asset demands are bounded. Moreover,
0 ≤ xi
l,s ≤ ei










l,s + ¯ Rs·yi,s ∈ S,










, ¯ y)is compact and convex.
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n, ¯ yn) = (y
¯
, ¯ y), it follows that the sequence (yi














l,s + ¯ Rs·yi
n,s ∈ S,
and since the sequence ((z
¯
n, ¯ zn) : n = 1,...)is convergent, the sequence (xi
n : n = 1,...)
is bounded. It follows that ((xi
n,yi
n) : n = 1,...) has a convergent subsequence, also
denoted ((xi
n,yi









, ¯ y),suchthatui(˜ xi)>u i(ˆ xi),then ˜ K− ( ˜ K+)istheset
of non-numeraire commodities for which ˜ xi
l,s − ei
l,s is negative (positive), and ˜ A− ( ˜ A+)i s
thesetofnon-numeraireassetsforwhich ˜ yi




























n = ei + λn(˜ xi − ei), ˜ yi
n = λn ˜ yi.P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155 143
Since
¯ q ˜ yi
n = λn¯ q ˜ yi = 0,
¯ ps(˜ xi
n,s − ei
s) = λn ¯ ps(˜ xi
s − ei

















n,l,s,( l , s ) ∈ ˜ K−,
˜ xi
n,l,s − ei
l,s = λn(˜ xi
l,s − ei
l,s) ≥ 0 ≥ z
¯
n,l,s,( l , s ) ∈ ( ˇ L × S)\ ˜ K−,
˜ xi
n,l,s − ei









l,s) =¯ zn,l,s,( l , s ) ∈ ˜ K+,
˜ xi
n,l,s − ei
l,s = λn(˜ xi
l,s − ei










a ≤ λn ˜ yi
a =˜ yi
n,a ≤ 0 ≤¯ yn,a,a ∈ ˜ A−,
y
¯
n,a ≤ 0 ≤˜ yi






a =¯ yn,a,a ∈ ˜ A+,
(˜ xi
n, ˜ yi





Evidently, limn→∞λn = 1, and limn→∞(˜ xi
n, ˜ yi
n) = (˜ xi, ˜ yi). By the continuity of the func-
tion ui, ui(˜ xi
n)>u i(xi
n) for n sufﬁciently large, which contradicts (xi
n,yi





¯ yn). Consequently, ˜ δi is upper hemi-continuous. 
The demand of individuals depends in an upper hemi-continuous way on the constraints
they face in the markets of the non-numeraire assets and commodities. It is not necessary to
compactifyconsumptionsetsinordertogetthisresult,eventhoughtherearenorestrictions
whatsoever in the markets of the numeraire assets and the numeraire commodities.
It is more surprising, and more important, that neither interiority assumptions nor a
survival assumption are made with respect to initial endowments. Even though lower
hemi-continuity of the budget correspondence in prices may fail, lower hemi-continuity
in rationing constraints is satisﬁed.
ThesetofequilibriaforE isnotcompact,becauseallocationsofassetsarenotnecessarily
bounded, and rationing schemes are not bounded. There is a compact subset of the set of





∗, ¯ y∗)) is an equilibrium for E at prices ( ¯ p, ¯ q), then there is a
minimal effective feasible allocation of assets ˆ y ∈ ˆ Y satisfying
 
i∈I ˆ yi = 0, and, for
every individual, ¯ Rˆ yi = ¯ Ryi∗, ¯ q ˆ yi =¯ qyi∗, sign(ˆ yi) ∈ Sign(yi∗), and |ˆ yi
a|≤| yi∗
a |, for all




∗, ¯ y∗), i ∈ I,




∗, ¯ y∗)) is an equilibrium.
In the market for a commodity, (l,s) ∈ ˇ L × S, if there is an individual i  such that
xi ∗
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rationed in his demand for commodity (l,s),s oxi∗
l,s −ei
l,s < ¯ z∗
l,s, i ∈ I.F o raﬁ x e dε>0,





l,s < ¯ zl,s, i ∈ I. If there is an individual, i , such that
xi ∗
l,s − ei 
l,s =¯ z∗






l,s, i ∈ I.I fz
¯







l,s, i ∈ I.




individual is effectively rationed in his demand for asset a, ˆ yi
a < ¯ y∗
a, i ∈ I. Since ˆ yi
a < ˆ α,
if ¯ ya =ˆ α, then ˆ yi
a < ¯ ya, i ∈ I. If there is an individual i  such that ˆ yi 
a =¯ y∗
a, then no




a, i ∈ I. Since ˆ yi
a > −ˆ α,
if y
¯
a =−ˆ α, then ˆ yi
a >y
¯










, ¯ y)) with ||(z
¯
, ¯ z)||∞ bounded by
 
i∈I ei + ε, ||(y
¯
, ¯ y)||∞ bounded by ˆ α,
||x∗||∞ boundedby
 
i∈I ei and||ˆ y||∞ boundedby ˆ α.Werestrictourattentiontorationing
schemes and allocations that satisfy these bounds.
The unit cube of dimension K is CK ={ r ∈ RK :0≤ rk ≤ 1,k = 1,...,K}. The
functions (z
¯




, ¯ y) : CA →− RA
+ × RA


















,( l , s ) ∈ ˇ L × S,

















,( l , s ) ∈ ˇ L × S,
y
¯
a(ρ) =− min{2ρa ˆ α, ˆ α},a ∈ ˇ A,
¯ ya(ρ) = min{(2 − 2ρa)ˆ α, ˆ α},a ∈ ˇ A,
f o raﬁ x e dε>0.
Attention is restricted to rationing schemes in the image of the functions (z
¯
, ¯ z) and
(y
¯
, ¯ y).Thestateofthecommoditymarketsisdescribedbyr ∈ CLS andthestateoftheasset
markets by ρ ∈ CA.I f0≤ rl,s ≤ 1/2, then there may be supply rationing in the market of




if 1/2 ≤ rl,s ≤ 1, then there may be demand rationing in the market of commodity (l,s),





l,s − ε.I f0≤ ρa ≤ 1/2,
then there may be supply rationing in the market of asset a, while demand rationing is
excluded by putting ¯ ya(ρ) =ˆ α;i f1 /2 ≤ ρa ≤ 1, then there may be demand rationing in
the market of asset a, while supply rationing is excluded by putting y
¯
a(ρ) =−ˆ α.
The correspondences ˆ δi, i ∈ I, and ˆ ζ, with domain CLS × CA are deﬁned by
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The correspondence ˆ δi is a restriction of the correspondence ˜ δi, with rationing schemes
being parametrized by the sets CLS and CA.
Lemma4.2. IfE satisﬁesA1–A4,then,if0 ∈ ˆ ζ(r∗,ρ∗),thereexists(xi∗, ˆ yi)∈ ˆ δi(r∗,ρ∗),









∗, ¯ y∗)) is an equilibrium for E, then there exists (r∗,ρ∗) ∈ CLS ×CA
such that 0 ∈ ˆ ζ(r∗,ρ∗) and there exists ˆ y ∈ ˆ Y such that (xi∗, ˆ yi) ∈ ˆ δi(r∗,ρ∗), i ∈ I.











i∈I yi = 0.
There is a minimal effective feasible allocation of assets ˆ y ∈ ˆ Y, such that
 
i∈I ˆ yi = 0
and, for every individual, ¯ Rˆ yi = ¯ Ryi, ¯ q ˆ yi =¯ qyi, sign(ˆ yi) ∈ sign(yi), and |ˆ yi
a|≤| yi
a|,




(ρ∗), ¯ y(ρ∗)) and that (1) and (2) of





If, for (l,s) ∈ ˇ L × S, xi ∗
l,s − ei 
l,s = z
¯
l,s(r∗) for some i  ∈ I, then z
¯





l,s − ε.S or∗
l,s < 1/2, and ¯ zl,s(r∗) =
 
i∈I ei
l,s + ε. It follows that xi∗
l,s − ei
l,s <
¯ zl,s(r∗), for every individual.
If, for (l,s) ∈ ˇ L × S, xi ∗
l,s − ei 




l,s + ε.S or∗










l,s(r∗), for every individual.
If, for a ∈ ˇ A, ˆ yi 
a = y
¯
a(ρ∗) for some i  ∈ I, then y
¯
a(ρ∗)>−ˆ α since ˆ y ∈ ˆ Y.S o
ρ∗
l,s < 1/2, and ¯ ya(ρ∗) =ˆ α. It follows immediately that ˆ yi
a < ¯ ya(ρ∗), for every individual.
If,fora ∈ ˇ A, ˆ yi 
a =¯ ya(ρ∗)forsomei  ∈ I,theny
¯




a(ρ∗) =−ˆ α. Again, it follows immediately that ˆ yi
a >y
¯
a(ρ∗), for every individual.
Hence, (3) and (4) are satisﬁed as well in the deﬁnition of an equilibrium.




∗, ¯ y∗)) is an
equilibrium for E. It has been argued in Section 3 that there exists ˆ y ∈ ˆ Y such that
((x∗, ˆ y),(z
¯
∗, ¯ z∗, y
¯










∗, ¯ y∗), i ∈ I. If there is effective supply rationing in the market for commodity
(l,s) ∈ ˇ L × S, then let r∗





l,s. If there is effective demand ra-
tioning in the market for commodity (l,s) ∈ ˇ L × S, then r∗
l,s is set so that ¯ zl,s(r∗) =¯ z∗
l,s.
For all other commodities (l,s), the ones without effective rationing, r∗
l,s = 1/2. If there is
effective supply rationing in the market for asset a ∈ ˇ A, then ρ∗






If there is effective demand rationing in the market for asset a ∈ ˇ A, then ρ∗
a is such that
¯ za(ρ∗) =¯ z∗
a. For all other assets a, the ones without effective rationing, deﬁne ρ∗
a = 1/2. It




, ¯ y)that (xi∗, ˆ yi) ∈ ˆ δi(r∗,ρ∗), i ∈ I,
so 0 ∈ ˆ ζ(r∗,ρ∗). 
The preparatory work is complete. It remains to show that there exists a zero point of ˆ ζ
and thereby, an equilibrium. By Lemma 4.2, this implies the existence of an equilibrium146 P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155
for E. Moreover, the construction used implies that no equilibrium allocations are lost
by restricting attention to zero points of ˆ ζ. Since there is no rationing in the market of the
numeraireassetnorinthemarketofthenumerairecommodities,existenceofanequilibrium
is not obvious.
Theorem 4.3. If E satisﬁes A1–A4, then an equilibrium for E at prices ( ¯ p, ¯ q)exists.
Proof. The correspondence ˆ ζ is non-empty, compact, convex valued and upper hemi-
continuous. It follows that the set ˆ ζ(CLS × CA) is compact.
The set ZY is compact, convex, and it contains ˆ ζ(CLS × CA). The correspondence µ :















The correspondence ϕ : ZY × CLS × CA → ZY × CLS × CA is deﬁned by
ϕ(z,y,r,ρ) = ˆ ζ(r,ρ)× µ(z,y).
It is a non-empty, compact, convex valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence deﬁned
on a non-empty, compact, convex set. By Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem, ϕ h a saﬁ x e d
point, (z∗,y∗,r∗,ρ∗).




If for some a ∈ ˇ A, y∗
a > 0, then by the deﬁnition of µ,ρ∗
a = 1, so y∗
a ≤ 0, a contradiction.
Consequently, y∗
a = 0, for all a ∈ ˇ A. Moreover, y∗
A+1 =−
 
a∈ ˇ A ¯ qay∗
a = 0.
If for some (l,s) ∈ ˇ L × S, z∗
l,s < 0, then by the deﬁnition of µ,r∗
l,s = 0, so z∗
l,s ≥ 0,
a contradiction. If for some (l,s) ∈ ˇ L × S, z∗
l,s > 0, then by the deﬁnition of µ,r∗
l,s = 1,
so z∗
l,s ≤ 0, a contradiction. Consequently, z∗
l,s = 0, for all (l,s) ∈ ˇ L × S. Moreover, for
every s ∈ S, z∗
L+1,s =−
 
(l,s)∈ ˇ L×S ¯ pl,sz∗
l,s + ¯ Rs·y∗ = 0.
It follows that 0 ∈ ˆ ζ(r∗,ρ∗), and, hence, an equilibrium exists. 
It has been argued before that the conditions under which equilibria exist are very weak.
Norestrictionsaremadeonthepricesofassetsandcommodities,apartfromtherequirement
that the prices of the numeraire assets and the numeraire commodities are 1. The prices of
assets do not have to satisfy the no-arbitrage conditions. Evidently, if the no-arbitrage
condition is violated, one expects that all traders want to operate on the same side of the
asset markets that are needed to construct an arbitrage portfolio. If indeed all traders are on
the same side of an asset market, then no trade is possible in such an asset, as there are no
partners to trade with. Although it is shown in Section 6 that this intuition is not entirely
correct, it still indicates why violation of the no-arbitrage condition is not inconsistent with
existenceofequilibrium.Endogenousboundsontradethatarisebecauseofalackoftrading
partners restore the existence of equilibrium.P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155 147
5. Hart’s counterexample
To gain some additional insight into our equilibrium concept, it is fruitful to analyze the
counterexample to existence of a competitive equilibrium as presented in Hart (1975).W e
consider the economy E = ((Xi,u i,ei)i∈I,R(p,q))with two commodities (L = 1) in
each of the two states (S = 2), two individuals (I = 2) and two assets (A = 1). The utility













































































Each of the two future states occurs with probability 1/2, individual 1 spends 75% of his
total income in each state on commodity 1, and individual 2 spends 75% of his total income
on commodity 2. Here, income in a state is the income that results after transactions in the
asset markets in the ﬁrst period. Household 1 has high endowments in state 1 and will try to
shufﬂe income to the other state by appropriate transactions on the asset markets, whereas
the reverse holds for agent 2.
Two assets are traded, the futures for commodities 1 and 2, respectively. The asset return








by Hart (1975). If, at competitive equilibrium prices (p∗,q∗), R(p∗,q∗) has full rank, mar-
ketsarecomplete;theallocationalequivalencewithacompletemarketsequilibriumimplies
that the equilibrium allocation is given by (x1∗,x2∗) = ((3/4,1/4,3/4,1/4),(1/4,3/4,





Then the rank of R(p∗,q∗) is one, a contradiction to the hypothesis that it has full rank.
If R(p∗,q∗) has rank one, the no-arbitrage condition on prices of assets implies that it is
not possible to transfer income from one state into the other one by trade in assets. After a
certain state is realized, the economy is like a standard economy with two commodities. It
can be veriﬁed that p1,1 = (5/3)p2,1 and p1,2 = (3/5)p2,2 is the only possibility to clear
the spot markets. But then R(p,q) has full rank, contradicting our supposition.148 P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155
Asbefore,thepriceofthesecondcommodityisnormalizedto1.Ifmarketswerecomplete,
then the competitive equilibrium price system for commodities would be given by ¯ p =
((1,1),(1,1)). The prices of the futures are then determined by a no-arbitrage condition
and equal ¯ q = (1,1). In the economy E this does not constitute a competitive equilibrium,
as markets are not complete if all commodity prices equal to 1. Endogenous restrictions on
trade emerge at those prices.
The requirement ¯ qyi = 0 implies yi
2 =− yi
1. The structure of the asset return matrix is









can be replaced by the minimal effective allocation of assets ((0,0),(0,0)) ∈ ˆ Y. Without
effective rationing, the demand for commodities of individual 1 in state 1 is (9/8,3/8)
and in state 2 (3/8,1/8). Without effective rationing, the demand for commodities of
individual 2 is ((1/8,3/8),(3/8,9/8)). There is excess demand for commodity 1 in state 1
and excess supply for commodity 1 in state 2, which is also consistent with our observation
before that a price of 5/3 for commodity 1 in state 1 and a price of 3/5 for commodity
1 in state 2 is needed to clear the markets. The net demand possibilities of individual 1
for commodity 1 in state 1 are determined by the net supply of individual 2 and equal
1/8. Similarly, the net supply possibilities of individual 2 for commodity 1 in state 2 are
determined by the net demand of individual 1 and equal 1/8 as well. An equilibrium for





such that x∗1 = ((7/8,5/8),(3/8,1/8)), x∗2 = ((1/8,3/8),(5/8,7/8)), y∗1 = (0,0),
y∗2 = (0,0), ¯ z∗
1,1 = 1/8, z
¯
∗
1,2 =− 1/8, and the other components of z
¯
∗ and ¯ z∗, as well as
y
¯
∗ and ¯ y∗ are chosen as not to be binding.
Another interesting price system to analyze is the one where period 2 commodity prices
equilibratethemarkets,giventhatnotradetakesplaceintheassetmarketsintheﬁrstperiod.









Suppose again that ¯ q = (1,1). The ﬁrst period budget constraint implies yi
2 =− yi
1.I f
no further constraints on supply and demand are present, then optimization of individual
1 at prices ¯ p and ¯ q leads to a demand x1 = ((3/5,1/3),(1,1/5)) for commodities and
y1 = (−1,1) for assets. The payoffs of assets enable the ﬁrst individual to transfer income
to the second state where he is poor, which is achieved by going short in asset 1 and long in
asset2.Thereversehappensforindividual2,whohasademandx2 = ((1/5,1),(1/3,3/5))
for commodities and y2 = (1,−1) for assets if there is no effective rationing.
The asset markets are effectively complete, but the price for commodity 1 in state 1
is higher than the complete markets competitive equilibrium value, whereas the price for
commodity 1in state 2 is lower. It is not surprising that there is excess supply of commodity
1instate1andexcessdemandforcommodity1instate2.Supplyofcommodity1instate2
byindividual2fallsshortofdemandbyindividual1byaratherlargeamount,whichcauses
individual 1 to be effectively rationed in his demand for that commodity. As a consequence,P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155 149
individual 1 transfers less income to state 2, and therefore supplies less of asset 1 in the ﬁrst
period. It also causes individual 1 to demand more of both commodities in state 1. Supply
ofcommodity1instate1byindividual2willbeconstrainedbythedemandofindividual1,
buttheconstraintwillnotbitetoomuchasasanunconstrainedindividual2isnotsupplying
much of that commodity. If individual 2 takes the constraint on the supply of commodity







1,2 = 1/3, ¯ y∗
1 = 1/2, the demand of individual 1 is x∗1 = ((3/4,5/12),(7/12,1/4)),
y∗1 = (−1/2,1/2), and the demand of individual 2 is x∗2 = ((1/4,7/12),(5/12,3/4)),
y∗2 = (1/2,−1/2): these constraints indeed induce an equilibrium.
If ¯ p = ((5/3,1),(3/5,1)), then the price for commodity (1,1) is high and the price
for commodity (1,2) low relative to a complete markets competitive equilibrium. It is not
surprisingthatinournotionofequilibriumsupplyrationingarisesintheﬁrstmarketandde-
mandrationinginthesecond.Atthoseprices,individualsutilizetheassetstotransferincome
fromonestatetoanother.Eventhoughtheprices ¯ p = ((1,1),(1,1))areinaccordancewith
a complete markets competitive equilibrium, whereas the prices ¯ p = ((5/3,1),(3/5,1))
are not, the spanning opportunities offered by the latter, make the equilibrium at those
prices Pareto dominate the equilibrium at the former. It can be veriﬁed that an increase of
the consumption of all commodities in the former equilibrium by 15% keeps it inferior to
the latter.
6. Arbitrage
An arbitrage portfolio ˆ y is such that ¯ q ˆ y ≤ 0, while ¯ Rˆ y>0. Prices of assets allow
for arbitrage if an arbitrage portfolio exists. Theorem 4.3 shows that equilibria exist when
prices of assets allow for arbitrage. But the presence of arbitrage opportunities imposes
restrictions on rationing in equilibrium.
Theutilityfunctionofanindividualissaidtobemonotonicallyincreasinginthenumeraire
commodity at every state of the world if, for all xi ∈ Xi, for s ∈ S, for k ≥ 0, ui(xi +
k1(L+1)s)>u i(xi).
Proposition6.1. IfE satisﬁesA1–A3andtheutilityfunctionofeveryindividualismonoton-





∗, ¯ y∗)) is an equilibrium for E and ˆ y is an arbitrage portfolio, there exists for








Proof. If the statement is false, then there is an individual, i, such that, for every a ∈ ˇ A,
if ˆ ya > 0, yi∗
a < ¯ y∗









a + λˆ ya ≤¯ y∗
a, for all a ∈ ˇ A. But then, the pair of a consumption plan and
a portfolio (xi,yi) deﬁned by yi = yi∗ + λˆ y, xi
l,s = xi∗
l,s, for all (l,s) ∈ ˇ L × S, and
xi
L+1,s = xi∗
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Since the utility function is monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity at every
state of the world, ui(xi)>u i(xi∗), a contradiction. 
Proposition6.1makesprecisewhatsortofendogenouslimitationsontradeemergewhen
arbitrage possibilities exist. If arbitrage possibilities are present, then each individual will
faceconstraintsontradeinsomeoftheassetmarketsthatareneededtoconstructanarbitrage
portfolio. These constraints are related to the side of the market on which one has to be to
perform the arbitrage. The intuition behind this result is clear. If some individual faces no
constraints, it would add an arbitrage portfolio to its existing portfolio of assets and thereby
increase its utility.
When an arbitrage opportunity is present, all individuals try to proﬁt from it. As a result,
it seems likely that all individuals would be on the same side of all asset markets that are
used in the arbitrage. The endogenous constraints on trade that emerge would then be such
that no trade in these markets is possible.











prices of assets are q◦, an effective portfolio is y◦, and the matrix of effective payoffs of
assetsisR◦.Aneffectivearbitrageportfolio ˆ y◦ issuchthatq◦ ˆ y◦ ≤ 0,while ¯ R◦ ˆ y◦ > 0.The
intuition of the previous paragraph suggests that effective arbitrage portfolios do not exist.
Proposition6.2. IfE satisﬁesA1–A3andtheutilityfunctionofeveryindividualismonoton-





∗, ¯ y∗)) is an equilibrium for E at which at most two asset markets are open,
|A◦|≤2, there is no effective arbitrage portfolio.
Proof. If |A◦|=1, the argument is trivial since the only open asset market is the one of
the numeraire asset. The existence of an effective arbitrage portfolio is then contradictory
to the existence of an equilibrium.
If|A◦|=2,thenthereexistsanon-numeraireasset, ¯ a ∈ A◦.Ifˆ y◦ isaneffectivearbitrage
portfolio, then either ˆ y◦
¯ a = 0o rˆ y◦
¯ a  = 0. If ˆ y◦
¯ a = 0, then q◦ ˆ y◦ ≤ 0 and R◦ ˆ y◦ > 0 implies
R·A+1 < 0,soanequilibriumdoesnotexist,acontradiction.If ˆ y◦
¯ a > 0,thenProposition6.1
implies that yi∗
¯ a =¯ y∗
¯ a, for all i ∈ I. Thus, by market clearing, ¯ y∗
¯ a = 0, and the market for
asset ¯ a is not open, a contradiction. If ˆ y◦
¯ a < 0, it follows by a similar argument that y
¯
∗
¯ a = 0,
the market for asset ¯ a is not open, again leading to a contradiction. 
Although the result is rather minimal in the sense that it considers only the case with
at most two open asset markets, it conﬁrms standard intuition. The existence of effective
arbitrage portfolios makes all individuals operate on the same side of the markets involved
in the arbitrage, which, as a consequence, close.
7. An example permitting effective arbitrage portfolios
Theresultdoesnotextendtoequilibriawiththreeormoreopenassetmarkets.Withthree
assets and three individuals, it is even possible that at an equilibrium one individual holdsP.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155 151
an arbitrage portfolio that the other two individuals, together, supply. It is surprising that
equilibria with effective arbitrage opportunities may exist.
In the economy E = ((Xi,u i,ei)i∈I, ¯ R), there is one commodity (L = 0) at each of
the three states (S = 3), three individuals (I = 3) and three assets (A = 2). The utility






















Prices of commodities and assets are
¯ p = (1,1,1),
¯ q = (1/2,1/2,1).











The economy satisﬁes Assumptions A1–A3, so Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 apply. At an equi-
librium with one or two open asset markets, an effective arbitrage portfolio does not exist.
Since there are three assets in the economy, Proposition 6.2 does not cover all possible
cases.
An arbitrage portfolio ˆ y satisﬁes
−4ˆ y1 + 2ˆ y2 − 2ˆ y3 ≥ 0,
2ˆ y1 − 4ˆ y2 − 2ˆ y3 ≥ 0,
2ˆ y1 + 2ˆ y2 + 6ˆ y3 ≥ 0,
with at least one strict inequality, and
ˆ y1 +ˆ y2 + 2ˆ y3 ≤ 0.
For λ>0, the portfolio ˆ yλ = (−λ,−λ,λ) is an arbitrage portfolio. It holds that ¯ Rˆ yλ =
(0,0,2λ)  > 0, while ¯ q ˆ yλ = 0.152 P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155
Although the individuals have to choose between three assets and three commodities,
using the budget constraints, it is easily seen that they actually face a two-dimensional




































an individual with a utility function ui(xi) = aixi
1 + bixi
2 + cixi
3 solves the optimization
problem
max(−3ai + 3bi − ci)yi
































∗, ¯ y∗)) is an equilibrium for E at prices ( ¯ p, ¯ q), since, for any λ>0,
yλ is an arbitrage portfolio, it follows by Proposition 6.1 that all individuals are effectively
rationed in the supply of asset 1 or asset 2. If no individual is effectively rationed in the
supply of asset 2, then every individual is effectively rationed in the supply of asset 1, and
market clearing implies that y
¯
∗
1 = 0. Irrespective of rationing in the demand of asset 2,
individual 2 supplies 2 units of asset 2 and individual 3 supply 4/3 units of asset 2, whereas
individual 1 demands at most 2 units of this asset, which is a contradiction. Similarly,
there is no equilibrium without effective rationing in the supply of asset market 1. Con-
sequently, in every equilibrium, there is effective rationing in the supply of both assets.
Condition 4 in the deﬁnition of an equilibrium implies that there is no effective rationing
in the demand of any asset. Therefore, the demand for assets 1 and 2, and, hence, for asset
3 as well as for commodities, is a function of the rationing scheme on the supplies of the
assets. The derivation of the demand functions is facilitated by the graphic illustration of









∗, ¯ y∗)), with z
¯
∗ and ¯ z∗ not coming into play since there are no
non-numeraire commodities, y
¯
∗ = (−1,−1) , ¯ y∗ >( 2,2)  (the exact choice does not
matter). Then x1∗ = (12,0,2) , x2∗ = (0,12,2) , x3∗ = (5,5,7) , y1∗ = (−1,2,−1/2) ,
y2∗ = (2,−1, −1/2) , and y3∗ = (−1,−1,1) . This describes the unique equilibrium,P.J.J. Herings, H. Polemarchakis/Journal of Mathematical Economics 37 (2002) 133–155 153
Fig. 1. Decision problems of the three individuals.
where equilibria are equivalent if they differ only with respect to rationing schemes that are
not effective.


































   































































































The unique solution is y
¯
= (−1,−1) .
At the equilibrium, individuals 1 and 2, together, supply the arbitrage portfolio that
individual 3 holds.
8. Conclusion
At any prices for commodities and assets, with rationing, an equilibrium allocation of
resources exists under weak assumptions. There is no need to resort to a generic argument,
even when markets are incomplete and assets are real or display an even more complicated
dependence on prices. Neither is there a need to make the usual, but unappealing interiority
assumption on endowments.
The equilibrium concept also provides a solution when the no-arbitrage condition on
prices is not satisﬁed. The logical consequence of the existence of arbitrage portfolios is
that all individuals try to exploit these arbitrage opportunities. This limits the possibilities
to ﬁnd trading partners needed for the arbitrage, which generates endogenously determined
constraintsonsuchtrades.Eventhoughmarketsclearinourconceptofequilibrium,market
clearance generally involves endogenously determined amounts of effective rationing.
Even though arbitrage possibilities are limited by endogenously generated constraints on
trade, it is not necessarily the case that all arbitrage opportunities are eliminated. It is even
possible for an individual to hold an arbitrage portfolio in equilibrium, which is, because of
market clearing, supplied by others. This phenomenon is rather counterintuitive since the
other individuals are not excluded from holding the arbitrage portfolio themselves.
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